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Abstract
This paper shows theoretically and experimentally that hearing expert opinions can
be a double-edged sword for collective decision making. We present a majoritar-
ian voting game of common interest where committee members receive not only
private information, but also expert information that is more accurate than pri-
vate information and observed by all members. In theory, there are Bayesian Nash
equilibria where the committee members’ voting strategy incorporates both types
of information and access to expert information enhances the efficiency of the ma-
jority decision. However, there is also a class of potentially inefficient equilibria
where a supermajority always follow expert information and the majority decision
does not aggregate private information. In the laboratory, the majority decisions
and the subjects’ voting behaviour were largely consistent with those in the class of
inefficient equilibria. We found a large efficiency loss due to the presence of expert
information especially when the committee size was large. We suggest that it may
be desirable for expert information to be revealed only to a subset of committee
members.
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1 Introduction
When collective decisions are made through voting, typically each voter has not only
private information known solely to themselves but also public information observed by
all voters. Examples of commonly held information in collective decision making include
“expert” opinions solicited by a committee, shared knowledge in a board meeting that
has emerged from pre-voting deliberation, and evidence presented to a jury. Such infor-
mation may well be superior to the private information each individual voter has, and
if so, it would be natural to expect that voting behaviour should incorporate the public
information at least to some extent.
Meanwhile, such public information is rarely perfect, and in particular expert opinions
are often alleged to have excessive influence on decision making. For example, recently
the IMF’s advice to the governments of some highly indebted countries have heavily in-
fluenced their parliamentary and cabinet decisions for austerity. However, the IMF’s
expertise has been questioned by specialists in monetary policy, and it has been reported
that the IMF itself has admitted that they may have underestimated the impact of their
austerity measure in Greece.1 Financial deregulations in the 1990s seem to have been
prompted by endorsements from financial experts at the time, but some politicians reflect
that in retrospect they may have followed expert opinions too naively.2 How would collec-
tive decision making through voting be influenced by shared information? If commonly
observed expert information is better than the information each voter has, would the
presence of such expert information improve the quality of the collective decision? Can
expert information have “too much” influence?
This paper addresses these questions experimentally, by introducing a public signal
into an otherwise classical Condorcet jury setup with majority rule. The public signal is
observed by all voters and assumed to be superior to the private signal each voter receives.
We call such a public signal “expert” information.3
Before reporting on the experiment we first present a majoritarian voting game with
expert information and identifies three types of equilibria of interest, namely i) the sym-
metric mixed strategy equilibrium where each member randomizes between following the
private and expert signals should they disagree; ii) the asymmetric pure strategy equilib-
rium where a certain number of members always follow the expert signal while the others
always follow the private signal; and iii) a class of equilibria where a supermajority and
hence the committee decision always follow the expert signal.4 We find that in the first
1“IMF ’to admit mistakes’ in handling Greek debt crisis and bailout”, Guardian, 4 June 2013, http://
www.guardian.co.uk/business/2013/jun/05/imf-admit-mistakes-greek-crisis-austerity
2“Gordon Brown admits ’big mistake’ over banking crisis”, BBC News, 13 March 2013, http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/business-13032013
3As we will discuss later in Section 2, the public signal can also be thought of as shared information
(common prior) emerged through pre-voting deliberation.
4While the voters may ignore their private information completely, they cannot ignore the expert
information completely in equilibrium. That is, voting according only to their private signal is never an
equilibrium, since if a voter knows that all the others will follow their private signals, he deviates and
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two equilibria, the expert signal is collectively taken into account in such a way that it
enhances the efficiency (accuracy) of the committee decision, and a fortiori the Condorcet
jury theorem (CJT) holds so that as the size of the committee becomes larger the prob-
ability that the decision is correct becomes higher and goes to 1. However, in the third
type of equilibria, private information is not reflected in the committee decision and the
efficiency of committee decision is identical to that of expert information, which may well
be lower than the efficiency the committee could achieve in the absence of expert infor-
mation. In other words, the introduction of expert information might reduce efficiency in
equilibrium.
Motivated by the possibility that expert information can enhance or diminish the
efficiency of equilibrium committee decisions, we conducted a laboratory experiment to
study the effect of expert information on voting behaviour and majority decisions. Of
particular interest is to see whether voters can play an efficient equilibrium, not least
because the efficient equilibria seem to require sophisticated coordination among voters.
Specifically, we set the accuracies of the signals in such a way that the expert signal is
more accurate than each voter’s private signal but less accurate than what the aggregation
of the private signals can achieve by informative voting without the expert signal. Such
parameter values seem plausible in that the expert opinion should be taken into account
but should not be decisive on its own. At the same time, they entail the possibility that
expert information may indeed be welfare reducing if more than a half of the voters follow
the expert obediently.
In the experiment we found that the voters followed the expert signal much more
frequently than they should in the efficient equilibria. Specifically, the majority decisions
followed the expert signal most of the time, which is consistent with the class of obedient
equilibria mentioned above. Another interesting finding is the marked heterogeneity in
voting behaviour. While there were voters who consistently followed their private signal
and ignored the public signal, a significant portion of voters followed the expert signal most
of the time. We will argue that the voters’ behaviour in our data can be best described
as that in an obedient equilibrium where a supermajority (and hence the decision) always
follow the expert signal so that no voter is pivotal.
Even if the committees in the laboratory followed expert information most of the time,
this does not necessarily imply that introducing expert information is harmful, because
in the absence of expert information the voters may not play the (efficiency maximizing)
equilibrium strategy of informative voting. Along with the treatments with both private
and expert information, we also ran control treatments where each voter received a pri-
vate signal only, in order to compare the observed efficiency of the committee decisions
with and without expert information. We found that for seven-person committees the
difference in the efficiency between the treatment and the control is insignificant, largely
due to some non-equilibrium behaviour (i.e., voting against private information) in the
follows the expert signal, which is by assumption superior to his private signal.
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control treatment which reduced the benchmark efficiency. However, for fifteen-person
committees, those without expert information performed much better than those with
expert information and the difference is significant, suggesting that expert information
was indeed harmful.
Our results suggest that, from the viewpoint of a social planner who decides whether
to and how to provide a committee with expert information, creating an equilibrium
with higher efficiency does not necessarily mean it is selected among other equilibria, and
in particular there is a possibility that provision of public information may lead to an
inefficient equilibrium being played.5 This concern seems particularly relevant when an
inefficient equilibrium is simple and intuitive to play, like the obedient equilibrium in our
model, while the efficient equilibrium requires subtle coordination. A natural solution to
this problem would be to rule out inefficient equilibria, if possible. In our model, if the
expert information is revealed only to a small subset of voters, the obedient equilibrium
where a supermajority always follow the expert can be ruled out. Moreover, if the size
of the subset is optimally chosen, there will be a simple and efficient equilibrium, where
this subset of the voters receive and vote according to the expert signal, and the others
who do not receive the expert information vote according to their own private signal.
Intuitively, such selective disclosure prevents an expert from having too much influence.
Alternatively, if an expert opinion is heard by all members, a coordination procedure
such as role assignment (e.g., who should follow the expert information and who should
ignore it) may lead to an efficient equilibrium. A contribution of this paper in this regard
is to demonstrate that, without a coordination device, an efficient equilibrium may not
necessarily be played even in a game of common interest especially when there is a simple
but inefficient equilibrium.
In their seminal paper Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) first introduced game-theoretic
equilibrium analysis to the Condorcet jury with independent private signals. They demon-
strated that voting according to the private signal is not generally consistent with equi-
librium behaviour. McLennan (1998) and Wit (1998) studied symmetric mixed strategy
equilibria in the model of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and showed that the CJT
holds in equilibrium for majority and super-majority rules (except for unanimity rule).
The experimental study on strategic voting was pioneered by Guarnaschelli et al. (2000)
who tested the model of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and found that the subjects’
behaviour was largely consistent with the theory. Focusing on unanimity rule, Ali et al.
(2008) found that the findings by Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) are fairly robust to voting
protocols such as the number of repetitions and timing of voting (simultaneous or se-
quential). The present paper focuses on majority rule, but examines the effect of public
information on voting behaviour and outcomes.
5As in standard models of voting, our model also has equilibria that are implausible from the view
point of application and efficiency, such as uninformative equilibrium where all committee members vote
for a particular option regardless of their private signal, and equilibrium where all members the vote
against the expert signal.
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The literature on deliberation in voting has studied public information endogenously
generated by voters sharing their otherwise private information through pre-voting delib-
eration (e.g., Coughlan, 2000; Austen-Smith and Feddersen, 2005; and Gerardi and Yariv,
2007). In these models, once a voter reveals his private information credibly, he has no
private information. Goeree and Yariv (2011) found in a laboratory experiment that de-
liberation diminishes differences in voting behaviour across different voting rules.
Battaglini et al. (2010) and Morton and Tyran (2011) report results from experiments
where voters are asymmetrically informed, to study how the quality of the private signal
affects their decision to abstain, in the spirit of the model of Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1996).6 The quality of the information each voter has in our framework also varies
according to whether the private and expert signals agree, in which case they provide
strong information about the state; or they disagree, in which case the uncertainty about
the state becomes relatively high. However, we do not allow voters to abstain, and more
importantly our primary interest is in the combination of private and public information,
which is fundamentally different from private information with different accuracy levels
in terms of the effect on the voters’ strategic choice, not least because the public signal in
our framework represents a perfectly correlated component of the information each voter
has.
While we focus on simultaneous move voting games, the inclination to ignore pri-
vate information in favour of expert information is reminiscent of rational herding in
sequential decisions. In the original rational herding literature (e.g., Banerjee, 1992;
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992) each player’s payoff is assumed to be deter-
mined only by his decision but not by others. Dekel and Piccione (2000) and Ali and Kartik
(2012) are among the papers that theoretically study sequential voting in collective de-
cision making where payoffs are intrinsically interdependent. Unlike the expert signal in
our setup, which is exogenously given to all voters, public information in their models
is generated endogenously by the observed choices of earlier voters. Dekel and Piccione
(2000) show that the multiple equilibria include an equilibrium where all voters vote in-
formatively and the outcome is efficient. Ali and Kartik (2012) identify equilibria that
exhibit herding whereby after observing some votes, the rest vote according to what the
earlier votes indicate, regardless of their private information. Hung and Plott (2001) con-
ducted a laboratory experiment on sequential voting with majority rule. They found that
some herding indeed occurred, resulting in inefficiency compared to informative voting.
Our model and experimental design are based on the uniform prior with expert infor-
mation. This structure is theoretically isomorphic to the case of the canonical Condorcet
jury model without public information but with a common non-uniform prior belief. The
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium we derive in this paper can be thought of as a spe-
cial case of the one shown by Wit (1998) who solved for the equilibrium without assuming
6Bhattacharya et al. (2014) study a related experimental setup but with costly voting.
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the uniform prior.7 However, we also explicitly derive an asymmetric pure strategy equi-
librium and its optimality, which has not been shown previously in the literature. In doing
so, we draw an important link between our fully strategic setup and the optimal voting rule
with heterogeneously informed but non-strategic voters studied by Nitzan and Paroush
(1982).8
The important advantage of adopting the uniform prior and expert information, rather
than a non-uniform prior without expert information, is that we are able to ask a po-
tentially useful policy question as to whether to, and how to bring expert opinions into
collective decision making. Our experiment is based on this premise, and provides us with
practical implications such as the possibility that the introduction of expert information
can reduce efficiency, even though theoretically it can enhance welfare if the voters coor-
dinate to play an efficient equilibrium. It would be impossible to address such an issue if
we adopted a non-uniform prior analogue without expert information, because in practice
the prior belief is seldom a choice variable in itself, while decision making bodies can often
choose whether to listen to expert opinions.
The role of public information and its welfare implications have been studied especially
in the context of coordination games (e.g. Morris and Shin, 2002; Angeletos and Pavan,
2004 and more recently Loeper et al., 2014). While theoretical models in that literature
point to the possibility that more accurate public information may reduce welfare, our
simple voting game (as in most other jury models) does not feature strategic complemen-
tarities, which means there is no direct payoff from taking the same action since the voters
are concerned only with whether the committee decision is right or wrong. Therefore the
mechanism through which public information has any effect on players’ choice and belief
is very different from that in coordination games. Cornand and Heinemann (2014) con-
ducted a laboratory experiment based on the coordination game of Morris and Shin (2002)
and found that subjects put less weight on public information in their choice, compared
to their unique equilibrium prediction. In our experiment, we found that subjects put
more weight on public information relative to the prediction from the efficient equilibria,
and moreover the subjects’ choices were consistent with the inefficient equilibrium.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our model,
and its equilibria are derived in Section 2. Section 3 presents the experimental design,
and Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
7For the same information structure, Liu (2015) proposes a voting procedure that leads to an equi-
librium where all agents vote according to their private signal, regardless of the quality of the public
information/common prior.
8While most theoretical studies on strategic voting focus on symmetric strategies, Persico (2004)
establishes the optimality of asymmetric strategy equilibrium in a voting game related to ours. However,
he does not give an explicit solution for such an equilibrium.
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2 Equilibrium Predictions
Consider a committee that consists of an odd number of agents n ∈ N = {1, 2, .., n}. Each
agent simultaneously casts a costless binary vote, denoted by xi = {A,B}, for a collective
decision y ∈ Y = {A,B}. The committee decision is determined by majority rule. The
binary state of the world is denoted by s ∈ S = {A,B}, where both events are ex ante
equally likely Pr[s = A] = Pr[s = B] = 1
2
. The members have identical preferences
ui : Y × S → R and the payoffs are normalized without loss of generality at 0 or 1.
Specifically we denote the vNM payoff by ui(y, s) and assume ui(A,A) = ui(B,B) = 1
and ui(A,B) = ui(B,A) = 0, ∀i ∈ N . This implies that the agents would like the decision
to be matched with the state.
Before voting, each agent receives two signals. One is a private signal about the state
σi ∈ K = {A,B}, for which the probability of the signal and the state being matched is
given by Pr[σi = A | s = A] = Pr[σi = B | s = B] = p, where p ∈ (1/2, 1]. We also have
Pr[σi = A | s = B] = Pr[σi = B | s = A] = 1− p.
In addition to the private signal, all agents in the committee observe a common public
signal σE ∈ L = {A,B}, which is assumed to be more accurate than each agent’s private
signal. Specifically, we assume Pr[σE = A | s = A] = Pr[σE = B | s = B] = q and
Pr[σE = A | s = B] = Pr[σE = B | s = A] = 1 − q, where q > p. Thus the model has
n private signals and one public signal, and they are all assumed to be independently
distributed. The agents do not communicate before they vote.
The public signal in our model has natural interpretations. It can be thought of
as expert information given to the entire committee as in, e.g. congressional hearings.
Briefing materials presented to and shared in the committee would also have the same
feature. Alternatively, it may capture shared knowledge held by all agents as a result
of pre-voting deliberation. In that case, the private signal represents any remaining un-
communicated information held by each agent, which is individually inferior to shared
information.9 Throughout this paper we often refer to the public information as expert
information. Note that in the absence of the public signal, there exists an informative
voting equilibrium such that xi = σi for any i and the Condorcet Jury Theorem holds
(Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996), so that as the number of agents becomes larger, the
probability of the majority decision approaches 1.
In what follows we consider equilibria in which voting behaviour and the outcome
depend on the signals the agents observe. Specifically, we focus on how agents vote
depending on whether their private and public signals agree or disagree, i.e., vi(A,A) =
9Suppose that every agent receives two independent signals σ
(1)
i
and σ
(2)
i
with accuracy p(1) and
p(2), respectively, but there is no public signal ex ante. Assume also that due to time, cognitive or
institutional constraints, only the first piece of information (σ
(1)
i
) can be shared through deliberation in
the committee before voting. If {σ
(1)
1 , σ
(1)
2 , ..., σ
(1)
n } are revealed to all agents, they collectively determine
the accuracy of public information q, while the accuracy of remaining private information for each agent
{σ
(2)
1 , σ
(2)
2 , ..., σ
(2)
n } is that of the second signal p(2). The collective accuracy of the shared signals depends
on the realization of {σ
(1)
1 , σ
(1)
2 , ..., σ
(1)
n } and we may not necessarily have q > p(2).
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vi(B,B) and vi(A,B) = vi(B,A) for any i. That is, the labelling of the state is assumed
irrelevant, in line with the feature that the payoffs depend only on whether the decision
matches the state, but not on which state was matched or mismatched.
2.1 Symmetric strategies
Let us focus our attention to symmetric strategy equilibria first, where vi(A,A) = vi(B,B) ≡
α and vi(B,A) = vi(A,B) ≡ β for any i. Note that because of the symmetry of the model
with respect to A and B, we can consider the cases of σE = A and σE = B as two in-
dependent and essentially identical games, where only the labelling differs. We start by
observing that expert information cannot be ignored in equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Every agent voting according to their own private signal is not a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix I.
The proposition has a straightforward intuition. Suppose that an agent is pivotal and
his private signal and the public signal disagree. In that event, the posterior of the agent
is such that the votes from the other agents, who vote according to their private signal,
are collectively uninformative, since there are equal numbers of the votes for A and B.
Given this, the agent compares the two signals and chooses to follow the public one as it
has higher accuracy (q > p), but such voting behaviour breaks the putative equilibrium
where every agent votes according to their private signal.
In contrast, there is an equilibrium where every agent follows the public signal.
Proposition 2. There exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where every agent votes ac-
cording to the public signal.
Proof. Consider agent i. If all the other agents vote according to the public signal, he is
indifferent to which alternative to vote for, and thus every agent adopting obedient voting
is an equilibrium.
We call this equilibrium obedient or the obedient equilibrium.
Next we show that there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where both private and
public signals are taken into account.
Proposition 3. If q ∈ (p, q¯(p, n)), there exists a unique mixed strategy equilibrium, where
q¯(p, n) =
(
p
1−p
)n+1
2
1 +
(
p
1−p
)n+1
2
.
In the equilibrium, the agents whose private signal coincides with the public signal vote
accordingly with probability α∗ = 1. The agents whose private signal disagrees with the
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public signal vote according to their private signal with probability
β∗ =
1− A(p, q, n)
p− A(p, q, n)(1− p)
, where A(p, q, n) =
(
q
1− q
) 2
n−1
(
1− p
p
)n+1
n−1
.
Proof. This partially follows from Wit (1998).10 A direct proof is given in Appendix I.
Note that in order for the mixed strategy equilibrium to exist, the accuracy of the
public signal has to be lower than a threshold q¯(p, n). If this is the case, there are
two symmetric equilibria of interest, namely i) the obedient equilibrium where all agents
follow the public signal; and ii) the mixed strategy equilibrium in which the agents take
into account both signals probabilistically. Meanwhile, if the public signal is sufficiently
accurate relative to the private signals (q ≥ q¯(p, n)), the latter equilibrium does not exist.
Let us consider the efficiency of the mixed strategy equilibrium in relation to that of
the obedient equilibrium.
Proposition 4. The mixed strategy equilibrium in Proposition 3 maximizes the efficiency
of the majority decisions with respect to α and β.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 1 in Wit (1998). A direct proof is given in Appendix
I.
Since the obedient equilibrium requires α = 1 and β = 0, the mixed strategy equilib-
rium outperforms the obedient equilibrium. Another direct implication of Proposition 4
is that providing the committee with expert information is beneficial if the agents play
the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium:
Corollary 1. The mixed strategy equilibrium identified in Proposition 3 outperforms the
informative voting equilibrium in the absence of public information.
The corollary holds because informative voting is equivalent to α = β = 1, and
Proposition 4 has just shown that the mixed strategy equilibrium (α∗ = 1 and β∗ ∈ (0, 1))
is optimal with respect to the choice of α and β.
2.2 Asymmetric strategies
In this subsection we examine equilibria in asymmetric strategies. As allowing asymmetric
strategies leads to a vast number of possible configurations of equilibria, we focus on i)
asymmetric strategy equilibria where the majority decision is the same as that in the
symmetric obedient equilibrium and ii) asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium that is
unique in an intuitive set of pure strategy profiles and is optimal in the set of all strategy
profiles.
10Cf. The proof of Lemma 2 in Wit (1998).
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2.2.1 Obedient outcome
The first type of asymmetric equilibria are a straightforward extension of the obedient
equilibrium in symmetric strategies (Proposition 2) and take the following “hybrid” form:
Proposition 5. For n ≥ 5 there exist equilibria where (n + 1)/2 + 1 or more agents
(a supermajority) vote according to the public signal and the rest vote arbitrarily. The
decision is obedient: the committee decision coincides with the public signal with probability
1.
Proof. This directly follows from the feature that, if a supermajority always vote according
to the public signal, no agent is pivotal. We have n ≥ 5 because if n = 3 then (n+1)/2+1
members following the public signal corresponds to the symmetric obedient strategy.
Note that it is not sufficient for the equilibria to have (n + 1)/2 agents following the
public signal, because if it is the case, these agents will be pivotal with positive probability.
Clearly Proposition 5 includes a class of payoff equivalent equilibria in which some agents
use pure strategies and the the others randomize:
Definition 1. A hybrid obedient equilibrium is an equilibrium where n ≥ 5 and (n +
1)/2 + 1 or more agents (i.e. a supermajority) are obedient to the public signal and at
least one of the rest adopts a non-obedient strategy.
While the majority decision in the equilibrium is trivial and identical to the symmetric
obedient equilibrium, the hybrid obedient equilibrium will be of significant interest in
interpreting the experimental results, as we will see later.
2.2.2 Asymmetric pure strategies
Let us now consider asymmetric pure strategies for which the committee decision is af-
fected by private signals. Let Γ be the set of all strategy profiles. In what follows we
focus on the strategy profiles where we have two groups of agents who vote differently
when the signals disagree.
Definition 2. M ⊂ Γ is the set of asymmetric pure strategy strategy profiles in which
m ∈ {1, 2, ..., n−1} “obedient” agents vote according to the public signal with probability
1, and n−m agents vote according to their private signal with probability 1.
Before describing the equilibrium, it is useful to define the subset of M in which the
committee decision is not obedient.
Definition 3. Mˆ ⊂M is the set of pure strategy profiles where m ∈ {1, 2, ..., (n+1)/2−
1}.
The following proposition states that, unless the accuracy of the public signal q is too
high relative to the accuracy of each private signal p, there is a unique equilibrium in Mˆ .
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Proposition 6. Let
m∗ ∈ N ∩
(
ln[q]− ln[1− q]
ln[p]− ln[1− p]
− 1,
ln[q]− ln[1− q]
ln[p]− ln[1− p]
]
.
If m∗ < (n + 1)/2, then m = m∗ is the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the set
of strategy profiles Mˆ . If m∗ ≥ (n + 1)/2, then any m ≥ (n + 1)/2 in M leads to an
equilibrium that is payoff equivalent to the obedient equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix I.
It remains to examine the efficiency of the asymmetric pure equilibrium.
Proposition 7. If m∗ < (n + 1)/2, then m∗ uniquely maximizes the expected welfare in
the set of all strategy profiles Γ.
Proof. See Appendix I.
To establish the optimality, we use the feature that the asymmetric equilibrium strat-
egy profile above can be translated into the optimal number of votes each agent should
have according to the accuracy of their signals, in a very different model where the agents
are assumed to vote informatively (Nitzan and Paroush, 1982). The Proposition 7 implies
the following ranking of the equilibria in terms of efficiency.
Proposition 8. The efficiency of equilibria in the voting game with expert information,
when they exist, is ranked as follows:
non-obedient asymmetric pure eqm ≻ symmetric mixed eqm ≻ obedient eqm. (1)
The ranking between the asymmetric pure equilibrium and the symmetric mixed equi-
librium has a natural intuition: insofar asm∗ represents the “optimal weight” to be placed
on the public signal, the symmetric mixed equilibrium achieves this optimal weight (i.e.
the number of agents who follow the public signal) with probability less than 1 and hence
it is dominated by the asymmetric pure equilibrium.
It is straightforward to observe that the sincere voting equilibrium without public
information can be better or worse than the obedient equilibrium, while it is dominated
by the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium and hence the non-obedient asymmetric
pure equilibrium. This implies that public information may lead the committee to a more
efficient equilibrium or a less efficient equilibrium. From the next section onwards, we
focus on the interesting case where the public signal is not too accurate and thus the
sincere voting equilibrium in the absence of public information is more efficient than the
obedient equilibrium in the presence of public information.
11
Table 1: Treatments
Treatment Private signal Public signal Comm. size No. of sessions No. of subjects
1 yes yes 7 3 7× 2× 3 = 42
2 yes yes 15 3 15× 3 = 45
3 yes no 7 3 7× 2× 3 = 42
4 yes no 15 3 15× 3 = 45
3 Experimental Design
So far we have seen that the introduction of expert information into a committee leads
to multiple equilibria of interest. On one hand, we have derived equilibria where such
public information is used to enhance efficiency. They require either subtle mixing or a
certain number of agents following the public signal regardless of their private signal. On
the other hand, however, there are equilibria where the outcome always follows the public
signal so that the CJT fails and the decision making efficiency may be reduced relative
to the informative voting equilibrium in the absence of expert information. Despite the
(potentially severe) inefficiency, these equilibria seem simple to play and require very little
coordination among agents.
In order to examine which equilibria best describe how people respond to expert infor-
mation in collective decision making, we use a controlled laboratory experiment to collect
data on voting behaviour when voters are given two types of information, private and
public. The experiment was conducted through computers at the Behavioural Labora-
tory at the University of Edinburgh.11 We ran four treatments, each of which had three
sessions, in order to vary committee size and whether or not the subjects received public
information. The variations were introduced across treatments rather than within be-
cause, as we will see shortly, we had to let our subjects play over relatively many periods,
in order to ensure that for each setup the subjects have enough (random) occurrences
where the private and public signals disagree. Each treatment involved either private
information only or both private and public information, and each session consisted of
either two seven-person committees or one fifteen-person committee (see Table1). The
committees made simple majority decisions for a binary state, namely which box (blue or
yellow) contains a prize randomly placed before the subjects receive their signals. The in-
structions were neutral with respect to the two types of information: private information
was literally referred to as “private information” and expert information was referred to
as “public information”. After the instructions were given, the subjects were allowed to
proceed to the voting game only if they gave correct answers to all short-answer questions
about the instructions.
For all treatments, the prior on the state was uniform and independent in each period,
and we set the accuracy of each private signal (blue or yellow) at p = 0.65 throughout.
11The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
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For the treatments with a public signal (also blue or yellow) we set its accuracy at q = 0.7.
We presented the subjects with the accuracy of the signals (p = 0.65 and q = 0.7) clearly
and explicitly in percentage terms, which was described by referring to a twenty-sided
dice in order to facilitate the understanding by the subjects who may not necessarily be
familiar with percentage representation of uncertainty.12
The parameter values, which involve a small difference between p and q, were chosen
so as to make the potential efficiency loss from the obedient outcome large. This is
a deliberate design feature to give the subjects strong incentive to avoid the obedient
equilibrium and coordinate on an efficient equilibrium by putting a large weight on the
private signals (if they are to play an equilibrium). From Proposition 6 we have m∗ = 1
in the efficient asymmetric pure equilibrium. That is, for both treatments, in order to
maximize the efficiency only one member in each committee should follow the public
signal and the rest should follow their private signals.13
Let PC(p, n) be the accuracy of the majority decision by an n-person committee with-
out public information when the accuracy of the private signal is p and all voters follow
it.14 In the absence of a public signal, following the private signal is also the most efficient
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996). The predicted accuracy of
decisions by seven-person committees with private signals only is PC(0.65, 7) = 0.8002
and that by fifteen-person committees is PC(0.65, 15) = 0.8868. Thus the accuracy of the
public information q = 0.7 is above each private signal but below what the committees
can collectively achieve by aggregating their private information. This implies that the
obedient equilibrium, in which the accuracy of decisions by committees of any size is
q = 0.7 as they coincide with the public signal, is less efficient than the informative voting
equilibrium without public information. Note that the symmetric mixed and asymmet-
ric pure equilibria we saw earlier for committees with expert information achieve higher
efficiency than PC(·, ·) (Corollary 1 and Proposition 8), although the margins are small
under the parameter values here. Specifically, the predicted efficiency of seven-person
committees with expert information is 0.8027 in the symmetric mixed equilibrium and
0.8119 in the asymmetric pure equilibrium; and the predicted efficiency of fifteen-person
committees is 0.8878 in the symmetric mixed equilibrium and 0.8922 in the asymmetric
pure equilibrium.
Note that from the theoretical viewpoint, the subjects in the treatments with both
types of information would have had a non-trivial decision to make when their private
and public signals disagree. Otherwise (when the two signals agree), they should vote
according to these signals in any of the three equilibria we are concerned with. Since the
probability of receiving disagreeing signals is only 0.44 (= 0.7 × 0.35 + 0.3 × 0.65), the
12Every subject was given a real twenty-sided dice.
13From Proposition 6 and p = 0.65, obedience to expert information is the optimal equilibrium outcome
for q > 0.9225 in a seven-person committee and q > 0.9930 in a fifteen-person committee.
14As is well known, PC(p, n) ≡
n∑
k= n+1
2
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k.
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Table 2: Voting behaviour: subjects’ choice and equilibrium predictions
7-person committees 15-person committees
treatment efficient equilibrium treatment efficient equilibrium
periods with expert sym. asym. with expert sym. asym.
vote for private signal overall 0.3501 0.9381 0.8571 0.3218 0.9745 0.9333
under disagreement 1-20 0.3511 0.2701
21-40 0.3571 0.3503
41-60 0.3421 0.3408
vote for signals overall 0.9488 1 1 0.9521 1 1
in agreement 1-20 0.9547 0.9515
21-40 0.9571 0.9552
41-60 0.9350 0.9498
voting game was run for sixty periods to make sure each subject has enough occurrences
of disagreement. In every treatment the sixty periods of the respective voting game were
preceded by another ten periods of the voting game with only private signals, in order to
increase the complexity of information in stages for the subjects in the public information
treatments.15 We do not use the data from the first ten periods of the treatments without
public signals, but it does not alter our results qualitatively.
After all subjects in a session cast their vote for each period, they were presented with
a feedback screen, which showed the true state, vote counts (how many voted for blue and
yellow respectively) of the committee they belong to, and payoff for the period.16 The com-
mittee membership was fixed throughout each session.17 This is primarily to encourage,
together with the feedback information, coordination towards an efficient equilibrium.
4 Experimental Results
In this section we present our experimental results. We first discuss the individual level
data to consider the change and heterogeneity of the subjects’ voting behaviour in the
treatments with expert information. We then examine the majority decisions in those
treatments and contrast them to the equilibrium predictions we discussed in Section 2
and other predictions based on bounded rationality. Finally we compare the efficiency
of the committee decisions in the treatments with expert information and that in the
treatments without expert information.
15The subjects in the private information treatments played the same game for seventy periods but
they were given a short break after the first ten periods, in order to make the main part (sixty periods)
of all treatments closer.
16The feedback screen did not include the signals of the other agents or who voted for each colour.
This is to capture the idea of private information and anonymous voting, and also to avoid information
overload.
17In the treatments for two seven-person committees, the membership was randomly assigned at the
beginning of each session.
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Figure 1: Distribution of voting behaviour with signals in disagreement
4.1 Voter choices with expert information
Let us first examine voting behaviour in the game with expert information. On Table 2 we
can observe immediately that, when the private and public signals disagree, the subjects
voted against their private signals much more often than they should in the efficiency
improving symmetric mixed and asymmetric pure equilibria.
As the informational advantage of the expert information over private information
is not large (70% versus 65%), in the symmetric mixed equilibrium the agents should
vote according to the private signal most of the time when the signals disagree (93.8% in
the seven-person and 97.5% in the fifteen-person committees, respectively). Also, from
Proposition 6 only one agent should be obedient to the expert in the asymmetric pure
equilibrium for both seven- and fifteen-person voting games, which implies the frequency
of voting for the private signal of 85.7% and 93.3%, respectively.
In the laboratory, by contrast, when the two signals disagreed the subjects voted
against their private signal in favour of the expert signal for the majority of the time, in
both the seven-person and fifteen-person committees. The frequency of following their
private signal was only 35.1% in the seven-person committees and 32.2% in the fifteen-
person committees. This, together with the high frequency of voting according to agreeing
signals which is close to 100%, implies a significant overall tendency to follow expert
information both individually and collectively.
Before discussing the influence of expert information on the voting outcome, let us
look at the heterogeneity and change in the subjects’ voting behaviour within sessions.
According to Figure 1, when the two signals disagreed, the highest fraction of the subjects
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Figure 2: Voting behaviour with signals in agreement and disagreement
(11 out of 42 in seven-person committees; 13 out of 45 in fifteen-person committees) voted
against the private signal always, or almost always (b <5%, where b is each subject’s
the frequency of voting for the private signal when the signals disagree). Apart from
those extreme “followers” of expert information, the subjects’ behaviour in terms of b is
relatively dispersed, while the density is still somewhat higher towards the left. At the
other extreme there were some subjects who consistently followed private information.
Therefore there was significant subject heterogeneity, and the low overall frequency of
following the private signal as documented in Table 2 was largely driven by the extreme
“followers”.
Meanwhile, we do not observe comparable heterogeneity in our subjects’ behaviour
when their signals agreed. Figure 2 indicates that most subjects voted according to signals
in agreement most of the time, and moreover, across the subjects we find no systematic
link between their behaviour when the signals agreed and when they disagreed.18 That
is, while there is a significant variation in voting behaviour with signals in disagreement,
even among the subjects who voted for the signals in agreement almost always (> 95%).
In what follows we focus primarily on voting behaviour when the signals disagreed.
Figure 3 depicts the evolution of voting behaviour over periods of disagreement, where
based on Figure 1 the subjects are divided into four behavioural types (with the bin
width of 25%) according to b, how often they followed the private signal when the signals
disagreed. The number of subjects who belong to each category is in parentheses the
18 The large circles at the right bottom corners in Figure 2 represent 6 (out of 42) subjects in seven-
person committees and 10 (out of 45) subjects in fifteen-person committees who always followed the
public signal. Any other circles represent a single subject.
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Table 3: Proportion of votes for private signal in periods with disagreement
periods with disagreement 7-person committees 15-person committees
vote for 1-5 0.3429 0.2267
private signal 6-10 0.3524 0.3244
11-15 0.3714 0.3378
16-20 0.3541 0.3378
legend of Figure 3. For example, in the seven-person (fifteen-person) committee treatment,
19 out of 42 (22 out of 45) subjects voted for the private signal under disagreement less
than 25% of the time. We computed the ratio of agents who followed the private signal
for each of the four types, according to the order of occurrences of receiving signals that
disagreed.19 The thickness of the lines corresponds to the relative size of each quartile.
Note that although the graphs are drawn over 25 periods, not every subject had 25
(or more) occurrences of disagreement since all signals were generated randomly and
independently. In the seven-person committee treatment all subjects had 19 or more
occurrences of disagreement, and in the fifteen-person committee treatment all subjects
had 22 or more. The shaded areas indicate that not all subjects are included in computing
the average voting behaviour under disagreement.
An interesting feature we observe in Figure 3 is that most subjects followed the public
signal for the first few occurrences of disagreement. However, soon afterwards different
types exhibited different voting patterns. In particular, the “unyielding” type of agents,
who followed the private signal most often (> 75%), quickly developed this distinct char-
acteristic. At the other end, the behavioural pattern of the “obedient” type of agents,
who followed the private signal least often (≤ 25%), was relatively consistent across the
occurrences of disagreement. The subjects who were in-between (frequency of voting for
the private signal between 25% and 75%) started with voting for the public signal more
often in the first few occurrences of disagreement but thereafter we do not observe a clear
change in their voting behaviour over time. Overall, Figure 3 indicates the emergence of
marked heterogeneity in voting behaviour in relatively early occurrences of disagreement.
In particular, few subjects showed voting behaviour that could potentially be consistent
with learning towards the strategy in an efficient equilibrium.
Also in the aggregate we do not observe any clear sign of learning towards an effi-
cient equilibrium. Table 3 suggests that the subjects’ choice under disagreement did not
change significantly or, in the seven-person committees, it was inclined towards the public
signal as they faced more occurrences of disagreement. This is in sharp contrast to the
overwhelmingly high proportion of votes for the private signal predicted for the efficient
equilibria.
Figure 3 also suggests that most subjects changed the way they responded to disagree-
19Thus the subjects had the first (second, third, etc.) occurrence of disagreement in different periods
of the session.
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Table 4: Random effects probit: dependent variable = 1 if voted for private signal under
disagreement
7-person comm. (1032 obs.) 15-person comm. (1173 obs.)
Period of disagreement -0.0066 -0.0112 0.0125** 0.0168**
(0.0067) (0.0095) (0.0059) (0.0083)
Expert was correct in last disag. period -0.2342** -0.3595* -0.5165*** -0.3885*
(0.1009) (0.2112) (0.0960) (0.1987)
Period of disagreement × 0.0092 -0.0085
Expert was correct in last disag. period (0.0135) (0.0116)
Constant -0.3557 -0.2986 -0.7486*** -0.8117***
(0.2355) (0.25045) (0.2439) (0.2586)
Log likelihood -483.7402 -483.5117 -533.0635 -532.7938
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level
ment as if they were randomizing. In order to see what potentially influenced voting be-
haviour while taking into account significant individual heterogeneity as observed earlier,
we ran random effects probit regressions for the rounds where the two signals disagreed.
Table 4 shows that the subjects were more likely to vote for the expert signal (and against
their own private signal) when the expert signal was correct (and the private signals was
incorrect) in the previous occurrence of disagreement. Some subjects seem to have linked
their choice to the observational accuracy of the expert signal, at least to some extent.
Note that this would hinder convergence to an efficient equilibrium, which requires a much
higher frequency to vote for the private signal, because if the signals disagree indeed the
expert signal is more likely to be correct.
4.2 Committee decisions with expert information
Let us now consider the majority decisions of the committees in relation to the presence of
the public signal, which are summarized in Table 5. A striking feature for both treatments
is that the decisions followed the expert information most of the time (97.8% for the seven-
person committees and 100% for the fifteen-person committees), while the predictions for
the two efficient equilibria suggest only 67-72%. Moreover, the decisions in the laboratory
were much more likely to have margins of two or more than the predictions from the
symmetric mixed and asymmetric pure equilibria. Also, when for any decision that had
a margin of two or more, the decision followed expert information. Those features are
again far from the predictions of the efficient equilibria (see the last two rows of Table 5).
If anything, as we will discuss shortly, the majority decisions exhibit key aspects of the
hybrid obedient equilibrium we saw earlier.
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Table 5: Majority decisions by committees with expert information
7-person comm. 15-person comm.
treatment with efficient equilibrium treatment with efficient equilibrium
expert (360 obs.) sym. asym. expert (180 obs.) sym. asym.
Decision coincided with public signal 0.9778 0.6654 0.7237 1 0.6731 0.7023
Decisions made with margin ≥ 2 0.8583 0.5958 0.6000 1 0.7993 0.8033
of which followed public signal 1 0.6612 0.8143 1 0.6789 0.7396
4.3 Relation to equilibrium predictions
In Section 2 we considered three equilibria of interest, namely the symmetric mixed,
asymmetric pure, and obedient equilibria. Our subjects’ voting choices and committee
decisions exhibit some essential properties of the hybrid obedient equilibrium, where a
supermajority ((n+ 1)/2+ 1 or more agents) vote according to the expert signal and the
other agents’ strategies are arbitrary. The indeterminacy of the minority agents’ strategies
makes it difficult to establish a solid link between the prediction and the data, but in what
follows we argue that the subjects’ behaviour in our data is best construed as that in the
hybrid obedient equilibrium.
First, as we have seen in Table 5, the committee decisions followed the expert signal
most of the time (97.8% for seven-person committees and 100% for fifteen-person com-
mittees) as in the obedient equilibria where the decision follows the expert signal with
probability 1. In the other efficient equilibria we saw, this rate ranges from 67% to 72%
for both treatments. The difference in frequency between the predictions from the two
efficient equilibria and from the data is statistically significant.20
Second, again from Table 5, most decisions were made with the margin of two or
more votes (85.8% of the time for seven-person committees and 100% for fifteen-person
committees), which is an essential feature of the hybrid obedient equilibrium where no
voter should be pivotal. The predicted frequency of the majority decisions having the
margin of two or more in the efficient equilibria is about 60% for seven-person committees
and 80% for fifteen-person committees.
Third, more importantly, most (by the seven-person committees) or all (by the fifteen-
person committees) decisions made with the margin of two or more followed the expert
signal, while in the efficient equilibria such decisions do not need to follow the expert
signal (66-81%: see the last row of Table 5). From the subjects’ perspective, it might
well be that, having looked at the feedback every period, they perceived themselves as
playing an obedient equilibrium in the sense that they anticipated that the decision would
(almost) always follow the expert signal, and moreover they would not be able to influence
the outcome as they would not be pivotal.
Fourth, from the viewpoint of individual voting choices, the marked heterogeneity
20The p-value for the binomial test is 0.0000 for each efficient equilibrium with each committee size.
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makes symmetric strategies less plausible (Figures 1 and 3). Also, while the asymmetric
pure strategy equilibrium requires only one agent to follow the expert in every period,
there were on average more (1.8 subjects in the seven-person committees and 4.3 in the
fifteen-person committees) who followed the expert signal more than 95% of the time.
Combined with the fact that the other subjects also frequently voted for the expert signal
in the face of disagreement, the profiles of voting choices seem much closer to those in
the hybrid obedient equilibrium. Indeed, individual voting choices are largely consistent
with its prediction, although it must be stressed that the arbitrariness of the equilibrium
voting behaviour of a minority makes it difficult to relate the equilibrium and the data
precisely.
Finally, Figure 3 and Table 3 show no clear sign of collective learning towards either
the efficient symmetric mixed or asymmetric pure equilibria, at least for 60 rounds of the
voting game. If anything, although the randomness of the combination of the two signals
makes it very difficult to observe a long-run trend in the laboratory, from our data the
voting pattern seems to have stabilized after several occurrences of disagreement, in the
manner closest to the hybrid obedient equilibrium as we have just discussed.
If we accept that an equilibrium was played (or approximated) and that the one played
was the hybrid obedient equilibrium, then it implies that the subjects selected a less effi-
cient equilibrium. Note that the efficient equilibria in our model may require substantive
coordination among the agents, especially in the presence of underlying uncertainty in
the state and two signals. The apparent simplicity of the obedient equilibrium might be
the reason why it may have been chosen despite its inefficiency.
Also, recall that for the experiment we chose the parameter values, including the rather
small 5% difference between p = 0.65 and q = 0.7, deliberately so that the efficiency gain
from playing an efficient equilibrium relative to the obedient equilibrium was pronounced.
This and the large proportion of votes for the expert signal suggest that the obedient
outcome we saw is unlikely to have resulted from our specific choice of p and q: we would
have observed obedience especially for larger differences in accuracy between expert and
private signals.
Another possibility however is that some or many subjects were following the expert
signal due to some form of irrationality. Even if this was the case, the fact that the
obedient outcome with a supermajority is an equilibrium must have made the outcome
more “robust” than otherwise, since regardless of why such subjects followed the expert
signal, doing the same was rational subjects’ (weak) best response too. Some alternative
interpretations of the data based on bounded rationality are discussed in Appendix II.
4.4 Efficiency comparison
Since the committee decisions mostly followed the expert signal, their efficiency is almost
(in the case of fifteen person committees, completely) identical to that of the expert
signal. If we posit that the subjects play the hybrid obedient equilibrium and that those
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in the treatments without expert information play the informative voting equilibrium by
following each one’s private signal, in expectation we should observe the efficiency loss
of PC(0.65, 7) − 0.7 = 0.1002 (14.3% reduction) for the seven-person committees and
PC(0.65, 15)− 0.7 = 0.1868 (26.7% reduction) due to the presence of expert information.
Table 6: Voting behaviour in committees without expert information
7-person committees 15-person committees
treatment without equilibrium treatment without equilibrium
expert (2520 obs.) expert (2700 obs.)
vote for private signal overall 0.8472 1 0.9141 1
first 30 0.8505 0.9111
last 30 0.8437 0.9170
In the laboratory, the subjects in the treatments without expert information voted
largely according to the equilibrium prediction of informative voting (Table 6). We ob-
served some deviation from the equilibrium strategy, as commonly observed in the liter-
ature on voting experiments for such a benchmark case. In our experiment the deviation
was more pronounced in the seven-person committees than in the fifteen-person commit-
tees, which is probably because subjects tended to deviate after observing the majority
decision being wrong and indeed by construction (conditional on informative voting) the
decisions are less likely to be correct in the seven-person committees (see Appendix III
for details). Note that, from each individual’s perspective, one private signal is less infor-
mative of the true state than a pair of private and public signals in agreement. We have
observed in Table 2 that the proportion of votes for the agreeing signals was about 95%
in both seven-person and fifteen-person committees, which is higher than the proportion
of votes for the public signal when expert information is absent. This is consistent with,
for example, the result from Morton and Tyran (2011) who found that the more accurate
the information subjects receive became, the more likely it was that they voted according
to the information.
Table 7: Observed efficiency
7-person comm. (180 obs. each) 15-person comm. (360 obs. each)
w/o expert with expert w/o expert with expert
Observed efficiency 0.7000 0.7389 0.8278 0.6778
Fisher’s exact test for difference not significant (p = 0.2809) significant (p = 0.0000)
Observed efficiency of expert information n/a 0.7222 n/a 0.6778
Hypoth. efficiency when 0.7972 0.8195 0.8778 0.8667
voting for private signal
Since informative voting achieves the highest efficiency in the voting game without
expert information, any deviation from the equilibrium strategy leads to efficiency loss.
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The first row on Table 7 records the observed (ex post) efficiency in the four treatments.
We can see that the efficiency of the decisions by the seven-person committees without
expert information was merely 70.0%, while if they every member voted according to
the private signal following the equilibrium strategy, given the actual signal realizations
in the treatment, they could achieve 79.7%. Meanwhile the seven-person committees
with expert information achieved 73.9%, even though they could have achieved higher
efficiency (82.0%) had they voted according to the private signal.21 While the precise
comparison of efficiency between the seven-person committees with and without expert
information is difficult due to different signal realizations in each treatment, the difference
in the observed efficiency is not statistically significant.
The last two columns of Table 7 give us a somewhat clearer picture. In the fifteen-
person committees without expert information, since the agents did not deviate much
from the equilibrium strategy of informative voting, the efficiency loss compared to the
hypothetical informative voting was small (82.8% vs. 87.8%). In the fifteen-person com-
mittees with expert information, since all decisions followed the expert information, the
efficiency was exactly the same as that of the expert signals, which was only 67.8%. Al-
though the exact comparison is not possible due to different signal realizations in each
treatment, the reduction in efficiency in the treatment with expert information is large
(82.8% → 67.8%, 22.1% reduction) and statistically significant.
5 Conclusions
This paper has studied the effects of a public signal on voting behaviour in committees
of common interest. In the first part of the paper, we have demonstrated that the pres-
ence of publicly observed expert information changes the structure of voting equilibria
substantially. In particular, every agent voting according to their own private signal is no
longer an equilibrium when the precision of the public signal is better than each agent’s
individual signal, as in expert opinions presented to the entire committee. If the expert
information is not too accurate, there are three informative equilibria of interest, namely
i) the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium where each member randomizes between
following the private and public signals should they disagree; ii) the asymmetric pure
strategy equilibrium where a certain number of members always follow the public signals
while the others always follow the private signal; and iii) a class of equilibria where the
committee’s majority decision always follows the expert information. When the expert
information is not too accurate, i) and ii) are more efficient but iii) can be less efficient
than the informative voting equilibrium without expert information. If the expert infor-
mation is very accurate, then the only informative equilibrium involves obedient voting,
21Note that every agent voting according to the private signal is not an equilibrium in the presence of
expert information (Proposition 1). Here we record the hypothetical efficiencies for both seven-person
and fifteen-person committees in order to represent the quality of the realized private signals in each
treatment.
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whereby every agent follows expert information, and this equilibrium is indeed efficient.22
In the second part, we have reported on the laboratory experiment we conducted to see
how human subjects react to expert information. In particular we set the parameter values
in such a way that the efficiency of the obedient equilibria is lower than what the agents
could have achieved in the informative voting equilibrium without expert information. We
found that the subjects followed expert information so frequently that most of the time
the committee decisions were the same as what the expert signal indicated. This is in
sharp contrast to the predictions from the efficient equilibria, where only a small number
of agents should (in expectation) follow the expert signal and as a result the committee
decision and expert signal may not necessarily coincide. We also found that the subjects’
behaviour was highly heterogeneous. Moreover the heterogeneity was persistent over many
periods and there was no clear sign of convergence to an efficient equilibrium. Given the
outcome and the heterogeneity in voting behaviour among the subjects, we have argued
that their choices can be interpreted as those in a hybrid obedient equilibrium, where a
supermajority follow expert information and the rest vote arbitrarily.
We have then contrasted the results to those from the control treatments where the
subjects received private signals only. We found that the efficiency without expert in-
formation was significantly higher than the efficiency with expert information for fifteen-
person committees. One interpretation of this result is that, the otherwise efficiency
improving provision of expert information actually reduced efficiency, by creating an in-
efficient equilibrium that is simple to play compared to the efficient equilibria. The dif-
ference in efficiency was not significant for seven-person committees, largely due to the
agents’ frequent non-equilibrium behaviour in the treatment without expert information,
which reduced the efficiency and made it close to the efficiency of the committee decisions
in the treatment with expert information.
Finally, this paper offers a potentially relevant “policy” implication. The optimality
of the asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium suggests that it may be desirable for the
expert to speak only to a subset of the members of a committee, unless his expertise q
is overwhelmingly high. The number of members he should speak to is m∗, as explicitly
computed for Proposition 6. In this case, the outcome of the equilibrium where m∗
members follow the expert and the rest follow the private signal is identical to the outcome
of the asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium we have seen earlier, but this form of selective
information revelation rules out equilibria that are less efficient, such as the symmetric
pure strategy equilibrium and the obedient equilibrium. Alternatively, if an expert is
heard by all members, there should be some coordination device such as role assignment
in place to make sure that the expert will not have excessive influence on committee
members. The results from our experiment suggest that it may not be adequate to
study an efficient equilibrium especially when it requires subtle coordination among many
22Recall from footnote 13 that for the accuracy of private information p = 0.65, obedience is the
optimal equilibrium outcome for q > 0.9225 in a seven-person committee and q > 0.9930 in a fifteen-
person committee.
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players, as is often the case in decision making by voting under uncertainty.
6 Appendix I: Proofs
6.1 Proposition 1 (not intended for publication)
Proof. Consider agent i’s strategy in the putative equilibrium where all the other agents
follow their private signal. He computes the difference in the expected payoff between
voting for A and B, conditional on his private and public signals, in the event where he
is pivotal. The payoff difference is given by
w(σi, σE) ≡ E[ui(A, s)− ui(B, s)|Piv(v−i), σi, σE ]Pr[Piv(v−i), σi, σE ]
=
1
2
Pr[σE|s = A]Pr[σi|s = A]Pr[Piv(v−i)|s = A]
−
1
2
Pr[σE|s = B]Pr[σi|s = B]Pr[Piv(v−i)|s = B], (2)
where the equality follows from the independence of the signals. Without loss of generality,
let us assume σi = B and σE = A. From (2) we have
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The inequality holds since q > p. This implies that agent i votes for A despite her private
signal B. Thus every agent voting according to the private signal is not a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
6.2 Proposition 3 (not intended for publication)
Before deriving the equilibrium, it is useful to note that the mixed strategy equilibrium
takes a “hybrid” form, where mixing occurs only when the private and public signals
disagree.
Lemma 1. Suppose there exists a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in mixed strate-
gies. In such an equilibrium, any agent whose private signal coincides with the public
signal votes according to the signals with probability 1.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let us assume σE = A to prove the lemma.
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Define
F (A) ≡ Pr[Piv(v−i)|s = A] =
n−1∑
k=0
min(k, n−12 )∑
j=0
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)n−1−k
×
(
k
j
)
αj(1− α)k−j
(
n− 1− k
n−1
2
− j
)
(1− β)
n−1
2
−jβ
n−1
2
−k+j (3)
and
F (B) ≡ Pr[Piv(v−i)|s = B] =
n−1∑
k=0
min(k, n−12 )∑
j=0
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)n−1−k
×
(
k
j
)
βj(1− β)k−j
(
n− 1− k
n−1
2
− j
)
(1− α)
n−1
2
−jα
n−1
2
−k+j. (4)
Using F (A) and F (B), we rewrite
w(A,A) =
1
2
[qpF (A)− (1− q)(1− p)F (B)] (5)
w(B,A) =
1
2
[q(1− p)F (A)− (1− q)pF (B)] . (6)
Note that (5) and (6) incorporate each agent’s Bayesian updating on the state and the
private signals other agents may have received, conditional on his own signal and the
public signal.
In order to have fully mixing equilibrium, namely α∗ ∈ (0, 1) and β∗ ∈ (0, 1), we must
have w(A,A) = 0 and w(B,A) = 0 simultaneously for indifference. In what follows, we
show that w(A,A) > 0 for any α and β, which implies in equilibrium we must have α∗ = 1
and if mixing occurs it must be only for β, that is, when the private and public signals
disagree. Specifically, we show that F (A) > F (B), which readily implies w(A,A) > 0
from (5).
From (5) and (6) we have F (A)− F (B) > 0 if
αj(1− α)k−j(1− β)
n−1
2
−jβ
n−1
2
−k+j > βj(1− β)k−j(1− α)
n−1
2
−jα
n−1
2
−k+j
⇔ β(1− β) > α(1− α)
⇔ (α + β − 1)(α− β) > 0. (7)
To see that (7) holds we will show that in equilibrium α∗ + β∗ − 1 > 0 and α∗ − β∗ > 0.
Let us first observe that α∗ + β∗ − 1 > 0. The difference in the difference in payoffs
between voting for A and B is given by
w(A,A)− w(B,A) =
q(2p− 1)
2
F (A) +
(1− q)(2p− 1)
2
F (B) > 0, (8)
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since both terms in the right hand side are positive since p, q > 1/2. Thus, given σE = A,
the equilibrium probability of voting for A when σi = A must be strictly greater than
that of voting for A when σi = B, which implies
23
α∗ + β∗ − 1 > 0. (9)
Second, let us show that α∗ > β∗. We assume instead that α∗ ≤ β∗ in equilibrium and
derives a contradiction. There is no hybrid equilibrium such that α∗ ∈ (0, 1) and β∗ = 1,
because from (7) and (9), α∗ ≤ β∗ implies F (A) ≤ F (B) and we may have a fully mixed
equilibrium, in which case w(A,A) = w(B,A) = 0. From (5) we have
w(A,A) = 0⇒
F (A)
F (B)
=
(1− q)(1− p)
qp
, (10)
and from (6)
w(B,A) = 0⇒
F (A)
F (B)
=
(1− q)p
q(1− p)
. (11)
We can see that (10) and (11) hold simultaneously if and only if p = 1/2, which is a
contradiction, since p ∈ (1/2, 1]. Thus we conclude that α∗ > β∗ in any mixed strategy
equilibrium equilibrium.
Combining α∗ > β∗ and (9), we can see that (7) holds. Thus we have F (A)−F (B) > 0
and w(A,A) > 0, which implies any mixed strategy equilibrium has to have a hybrid form,
such that α∗ = 1.
Lemma 1 is not surprising, because when both signals coincide they would jointly be
very informative about the actual state. The non-trivial part of the lemma is that this
intuition holds regardless of the mixing probability when the signals disagree. Thanks to
the lemma we can focus on mixing when the private and public signals disagree.
Proof of Proposition 3. From Lemma 1 any mixed strategy equilibrium involves vi(A,A) =
vi(B,B) = 1 and vi(A,B) = vi(B,A) = β ∈ (0, 1) for any i ∈ N . When the state and
the public signal match, the probability of each individual voting correctly for the state
is given by
ra ≡ p+ (1− p)(1− β), (12)
and when the state and the public signal disagree, the probability of each individual voting
correctly is
rb ≡ (1− p)× 0 + pβ = pβ. (13)
23See Lemma 1 in Wit (1998) for a similar argument.
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To have β∗ ∈ (0, 1), we need any agent to be indifference when the two signals disagree:
w(B,A) = q(1− p)
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
r
n−1
2
a (1− ra)
n−1
2 − (1− q)p
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
r
n−1
2
b (1− rb)
n−1
2 = 0 (14)
⇒
1− pβ
1− β(1− p)
=
(
q
1− q
) 2
n−1
(
1− p
p
)n+1
n−1
(15)
⇒ β∗ =
1− A(p, q, n)
p− A(p, q, n)(1− p)
, (16)
such that A(p, q, n) =
(
q
1−q
) 2
n−1
(
1−p
p
)n+1
n−1 . Thus when β∗ ∈ (0, 1) we obtain a mixed
strategy equilibrium of the hybrid form (α∗ = 1).
Finally, solving β∗ = 0 for q, we see that β∗ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if q ∈

p, ( p1−p)
n+1
2
1+( p1−p)
n+1
2

.
The uniqueness follows from the fact that the left hand side of (15) is strictly decreasing
in β.
6.3 Proposition 4 (not intended for publication)
Proof. In what follows we will find α = vi(A,A) = vi(B,B) and β = vi(B,A) = vi(A,B)
that maximize the probability of the majority outcome matching the correct state. Condi-
tional on the state s = A and σE = A, let the ex ante probability of each agent voting for
A be, from (12), ra ≡ pα+ (1− p)(1− β). Also from (13), conditional on the state s = A
and σE = B, let the probability of each agent voting for A be rb ≡ pβ + (1− p)(1− α).
Using ra and rb, the ex ante probability P (α, β) that the majority decision matches the
state can be written as
P (α, β) =Pr[M = s|s] = Pr[M = A|s = A]P [A] + Pr[M = B|s = B]P [B]
=Pr[M = A|s = A]
1
2
+ Pr[M = B|s = B]
1
2
= Pr[M = A|s = A]
=Pr[σE = A|s = A]Pr[M = A, σE = A|s = A]
+ Pr[σE = B|s = A]Pr[M = A, σE = B|s = A]
=q
n∑
k=n+1
2
(
n
k
)
rkA(1− rA)
n−k + (1− q)
n∑
k=n+1
2
(
n
k
)
rkB(1− rB)
n−k. (17)
Note that for
g(x) ≡
n∑
k=n+1
2
(
n
k
)
xk(1− x)n−k
we have
dg(x)
dx
= n
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
(x(1− x))
n−1
2 .
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Partially differentiating (17) with respect to α and β, we obtain
∂P (α, β)
∂α
= npq
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
(ra(1− ra))
n−1
2
− n(1− p)(1− q)
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
(rb(1− rb))
n−1
2 (18)
and
∂P (α, β)
∂β
= −(1− p)nq
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
(ra(1− ra))
n−1
2
+ pn(1− q)
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
(rb(1− rb))
n−1
2 . (19)
From (19), taking the first order condition with respect β we have
∂P (α, β)
∂β
= 0⇔
(
rb(1− rb)
ra(1− ra)
)n−1
2
=
q(1− p)
(1− q)p
. (20)
If (20) holds, then the derivative with respect to α, (18), is strictly positive for any
α ∈ [0, 1] since
∂P (α, β)
∂α
> 0⇔
qp
(1− q)(1− p)
>
(
rb(1− rb)
ra(1− ra)
)n−1
2
⇔
qp
(1− q)(1− p)
>
q(1− p)
(1− q)p
⇔ p >
1
2
.
Therefore we have a unique corner solution for α, namely α = 1, which coincides with the
equilibrium α∗ in the hybrid mixed strategy identified in Proposition 3. Note that the
first order condition (19) and the indifference condition for the mixed strategy equilibrium
(14) also coincide. Thus β = β∗ satisfies the first order condition.
It remains to show that the second order condition for the maximization with respect
to β is satisfied. Since P (α,β) is a polynomial it suffices to show that
∂2P (α, β)
∂β2
< 0⇒ −(1− p)nq
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
(ra(1− ra))
n−3
2 (1− p− 2β(1− p)2)
< pn(1− q)
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
(rb(1− rb))
n−3
2 (p− 2βp2). (21)
At β = β∗, (21) reduces to
(1− pβ)(1− 2(1− p)β) > (1− 2pβ)(1− (1− p)β),
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which holds since p > 1
2
. Since P (α, β) is a continuously differentiable function on a closed
interval, the local maximum at {α, β} = {1, β∗} is also the global maximum.
6.4 Proposition 6
Proof. Let us consider first them obedient agents, assuming the rest always vote according
to the private signal. In order for them to ignore their private signal when the two signals
disagree, we have to have wobedient(B,A) ≥ 0 for those agents. If such an agent is pivotal
given the strategy profile, among the n−m agents who always follow the private signal,
(n − 1)/2 of them must have received the private signal that disagrees with the public
signal, while (n−1)/2− (m−1) of them must have received the private signal that agrees
with the public signal. Therefore, for the obedient agent not to deviate when the two
signals he has received disagree, it has to be that
wobedient(B,A) ≥ 0⇒ q(1− p)
(
n− (m− 1)
n−1
2
)
p
n−1
2
−(m−1)(1− p)
n−1
2
− (1− q)p
(
n− (m− 1)
n−1
2
)
p
n−1
2 (1− p)
n−1
2
−(m−1) ≥ 0
⇒ q(1− p)p−(m−1) ≥ (1− q)p(1− p)−(m−1)
⇒ m ≤
ln[q]− ln[1− q]
ln[p]− ln[1− p]
. (22)
In other words, in order for the obedient agent not to deviate, the number of obedient
agents cannot be too large. Given (22), if the public and private signals agree, the obedient
agent votes according to the signals because
wobedient(A,A) = qp
(
n− (m− 1)
n−1
2
)
p
n−1
2
−(m−1)(1− p)
n−1
2
− (1− q)(1− p)
(
n− (m− 1)
n−1
2
)
p
n−1
2 (1− p)
n−1
2
−(m−1)
> q(1− p)
(
n− (m− 1)
n−1
2
)
p
n−1
2
−(m−1)(1− p)
n−1
2
− (1− q)p
(
n− (m− 1)
n−1
2
)
p
n−1
2 (1− p)
n−1
2
−(m−1)
= wobedient(B,A) ≥ 0.
The strict inequality follows from wobedient(B,A) ≥ 0 and p > 1/2.
Next, let us consider the n−m agents who always follow their private signal regardless
of the public signal. If an agent in this group is pivotal, it has to be that (n−1)/2 of them
have received the private signal that disagrees with the public signal, while (n−1)/2−m
of them have received the private signal that agrees with the public signal. Therefore, in
order for the agent not to deviate when the two signals he has received disagree, it has to
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be that
wind. informative(B,A) < 0⇒ q(1− p)
(
n−m
n−1
2
)
p
n−1
2
−m(1− p)
n−1
2
− (1− q)p
(
n−m
n−1
2
)
p
n−1
2 (1− p)
n−1
2
−m < 0
⇒ q(1− p)p−m < (1− q)p(1− p)−m
⇒ m >
ln[q]− ln[1− q]
ln[p]− ln[1− p]
− 1. (23)
In other words, the number of obedient agents cannot be too small. Given (23), if the
public and private signals agree, the agent indeed votes according to the signals because
wind. informative(A,A) = (1− q)(1− p)
(
n− (m− 1)
n−1
2
)
p
n−1
2
−(m−1)(1− p)
n−1
2
− qp
(
n− (m− 1)
n−1
2
)
p
n−1
2 (1− p)
n−1
2
−(m−1)
< q(1− p)
(
n− (m− 1)
n−1
2
)
p
n−1
2
−(m−1)(1− p)
n−1
2
− (1− q)p
(
n− (m− 1)
n−1
2
)
p
n−1
2 (1− p)
n−1
2
−(m−1)
= wind. informative(B,A) < 0.
The strict inequality follows from wind. informative(B,A) ≥ 0 and p > 1/2.
In equilibrium both (22) and (23) have to be satisfied, which gives the unique m∗ in Mˆ
as long as m∗ < (n+ 1)/2. If m∗ = (n+ 1)/2 then the majority decision always coincides
with the public signal, and hence any m ≥ (n + 1)/2 in M is an equilibrium. Suppose
m∗ > (n + 1)/2. In this case m = (n + 1)/2 is also an equilibrium since none of the
agents who follow the private signal are pivotal and no obedient agent deviates as (22) is
satisfied, which implies any m ≥ (n + 1)/2 in M is an equilibrium.
6.5 Proposition 7
Proof. Nitzan and Paroush (1982) gave the optimal weighted majority rule with i) non-
strategic informative voting; ii) agents each of whom observes a private signal with dif-
ferent accuracy; and iii) no public signal. Let us consider the special case of their setup
where the signal of one “expert” agent has the accuracy of q and those of n − 1 “non-
expert” agents have the same accuracy of p ∈ (0, 1), where q > p. In what follows we
show that the optimal rule in their model and the asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium
in Mˆ are isomorphic in terms of efficiency.
Theorem 1 in Nitzan and Paroush (1982) implies that, in the unique optimal majority
rule, the expert has ln[q]− ln[1−q] votes, while each non-expert agent has ln[p]− ln[1−p]
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votes.24 Equivalently, dividing the weights by ln[p] − ln[1 − p], the expert should have
ln[q]−ln[1−q]
ln[p]−ln[1−p]
votes if every non-expert is to have one vote. Moreover, under this optimal rule,
removing the votes of m¯ randomly chosen non-experts ex ante does not affect the ex ante
expected welfare, where m¯ is defined as the largest integer that satisfies m ≤ ln[q]−ln[1−q]
ln[p]−ln[1−p]
(Corollary 1 in Nitzan and Paroush, 1982). This is because the ex ante influence of their
votes on the expected welfare is cancelled by the increased votes of the expert. It is
straightforward to see that the same efficiency is implemented by the majority rule where
ex ante the expert has m¯ votes, each of n−m¯ non-experts has one vote, and m¯ non-experts
have no vote. Clearly we have m¯ = m∗. Therefore m∗ uniquely maximizes the expected
welfare in M .
Moreover, m∗ in M is the unique maximizer of welfare in the set of entire strategy
profiles Γ. To see this, note that Nitzan and Paroush (1982) allow p < 1/2 with infor-
mative voting, which is equivalent to allowing agents to vote against their signal in our
setting where p > 1/2. Also, uninformative voting by any agent clearly reduces efficiency
relative to the optimal weights and thus cannot be part of the optimal rule. For any
mixed strategy profiles, suppose that, without loss of generality, before observing the two
signals, each agent individually decides which alternative to vote for, conditional on each
combination of the two signals, according to his mixing probability. After these “interim
decisions” but before the agents receive the signals, we can compute the expected welfare
for each combination of their “interim decisions”. The profiles of their “interim decisions”
and their expected welfare coincide with those of the optimal rule only with probability
less than 1. Hence the asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium with m∗ achieves the highest
ex ante expected welfare over the set of all strategy profiles Γ.
7 Appendix II: Alternative Interpretations Based on
Bounded Rationality
7.1 Quantal response equilibrium
In the literature on voting experiments, it is common to consider quantal response equi-
librium (QRE; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) to see whether the experimental data on
subjects’ actions can be interpreted as deviation from a particular equilibrium prediction
of interest. Let us see whether subjects’ aggregate behaviour can be systematically linked
to the symmetric mixed equilibrium in Proposition 3, which is more efficient than the obe-
dient equilibrium and the informative voting equilibrium without public information.25
Let us derive the logistic quantal response function for the rationality parameter λ,
where λ → ∞ corresponds to perfect rationality and the symmetric mixed equilibrium
24Here we allow non-integer votes and the majority decision is the alternative that received more votes.
25As observed by Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) (see pp.417-8), if one allows asymmetric strategies in
voting games, the QRE correspondence for each voter may bifurcate and as a result become too complex
to obtain numerically or interpret, which is the case in our model.
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under consideration and λ = 0 corresponds to complete randomization (voting for either
alternative with 50% regardless of the information). Let α¯ = v−i(A,A) = v−i(B,B) and
β¯ = v−i(B,A) = v−i(A,B) for any −i ∈ {1, 2, ..., i − 1, i + 1, ..., n}. That is, α¯ is the
probability that all agents except agent i vote according to the signals in agreement, and
β¯ is the probability that all agents except agent i vote according to the private signal
when the signals disagree. Given that the expert signal is correct, the probability of each
agent −i voting for the correct state is ra ≡ pα¯ + (1 − p)(1 − β¯). Also, given that the
expert signal is correct, the probability of each agent −i voting for the correct state is
rb ≡ pβ¯ + (1− p)(1− α¯). Suppose these agents follow the mixed strategy as described in
Proposition 3.
If agent i votes according to the signals in agreement, his expected payoff is given by
E[uAAi (α¯, β¯)] =
pq
pq + (1− p)(1− q)
G(n− 1, (n+ 1)/2, ra)
+
(1− p)(1− q)
pq + (1− p)(1− q)
G(n− 1, (n+ 1)/2, rb),
where
G(n, l, x) ≡
n∑
k=l

 n
k

xk(1− x)n−k.
If agent i votes against the signals in agreement, his expected payoff is given by
E[uAOi (α¯, β¯)] =
pq
pq + (1− p)(1− q)
G(n− 1, (n+ 1)/2, ra)
+
(1− p)(1− q)
pq + (1− p)(1− q)
G(n− 1, (n+ 1)/2− 1, rb).
If agent i votes according to the private signal when the private and public signals
disagree, his expected payoff is given by
E[uDPi (α¯, β¯)] =
q(1− p)
q(1− p) + p(1− q)
G(n− 1, (n+ 1)/2, ra)
+
p(1− q)
q(1− p) + p(1− q)
G(n− 1, (n+ 1)/2− 1, rb).
If agent i votes according to the public signal when the private and public signals
disagree, his expected payoff is given by
E[uDEi (α¯, β¯)] =
q(1− p)
q(1− p) + p(1− q)
G(n− 1, (n+ 1)/2− 1, ra)
+
p(1− q)
q(1− p) + p(1− q)
G(n− 1, (n+ 1)/2, rb).
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Figure 4: Data and logistic QRE predictions for symmetric mixed equilibrium
Hence we have
α¯(λ) =
exp(λE[uAAi (α¯, β¯)])
exp(λE[uAAi (α¯, β¯)]) + exp(λE[u
AO
i (α¯, β¯)])
, (24)
β¯(λ) =
exp(λE[uDPi (α¯, β¯)])
exp(λE[uDPi (α¯, β¯)]) + exp(λE[u
DE
i (α¯, β¯)])
. (25)
The α¯ and β¯ that satisfy the system of (24) and (25) for p = 0.65, q = 0.7, and
n = 7, 15 as in the experiment are plotted on Figure 4, where the square dots correspond
to λ → ∞ and thus the symmetric mixed equilibrium for each treatment. Clearly the
data, represented by the circle dots, is further away from the QRE predictions.
In particular, with respect to the predictions, the likelihood of making an error when
the signals agree is significantly different from when the signals disagree (as can also be
seen in Table 2 and Figure 2). This is because, while the voting behaviour with signals
in agreement is very close to the equilibrium prediction (voting for these signals with
probability 1), the voting behaviour with signals in disagreement deviates substantially
from that in the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. Thus we are unable to assign a
reasonable common parameter to reflect the degree of error for this equilibrium.
Moreover it is easy to show from (25) that, if we fix α¯ = 1 and posit that the error
occurs only when the signals disagree, we have β¯(λ) ≥ 1/2 for any λ ∈ [0,∞). This is
inconsistent with the data which indicates β around 32-35% (Table 2).
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Table 8: Proportion of votes for private signal under disagreement
7-person committees 15-person committees
vote for private signal first period of session 0.1000 (2/20) 0.0870 (2/23)
first occurrence of disagreement 0.1190 (5/42) 0.1333 (6/45)
7.2 Cognitive hierarchy
Another approach to understanding the subjects’ behaviour especially in the first period
or the first occurrence of disagreement would be to use a cognitive hierarchy (level-k)
model (Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Nagel, 1995). In such a model, each player in a game has
a type denoted by level-k for a positive integer k. Level-k players anchor their beliefs in a
non-strategic level-0 players and adjust the beliefs with (virtual) iterated best responses,
in such a way that level-k players (for k ≥ 1) rationally best responds based on the belief
that all other players are level-(k − 1).
In order to apply the model we need to determine how level-0 voters should behave,
which seems non-trivial in our setup. If we assume, following Costinot and Kartik (2007),
that level-0 voters vote according to their private signal, level-1 voters should vote accord-
ing to the public signal as observed in Proposition 6, in which case level-2 voters become
indifferent with respect to their own vote, and thus it is impossible to obtain clear pre-
dictions for the behaviour of level-k voters for k ≥ 2. This is also the case if level-0 voters
randomize equally between the two choices regardless of their signal realizations; and if
level-0 voters vote according to the two signals when they agree and randomize equally
when they disagree. Meanwhile, if level-0 voters are to follow the public signal, then
naturally level-1 voters become indifferent and we have no clear prediction for any k.
In Table 8 we observe that a much higher proportion of the subjects voted for the public
signal in the first period or the first period under disagreement, compared to later periods
(see also Tables 2 and 3). One interpretation of this is that a substantive proportion of
the subjects believed that the others would vote for the private signal or disregard the
signals and randomize, as level-0 voters could do, and best responded to such beliefs by
voting for the public signal when the signals disagreed. Unfortunately, the indifference
level-2 voters face makes it impossible for us to clearly infer their k from the data.
7.3 Cursed equilibrium
Eyster and Rabin (2005) introduced another form of bounded rationality, where players
correctly take into account others’ actions, but fail to update their beliefs using the in-
formation implied in these actions. A single parameter χ ∈ [0, 1] represents “cursedness”,
where χ = 0 characterizes the standard Bayesian equilibrium and χ = 1 characterizes the
“fully cursed” equilibrium, in which agents decide on the best response by taking into
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account only the information they have.26
For the symmetric mixed strategies in our voting game, if χ = 0 then the agents play
the equilibrium strategy as described in Proposition 3 and thus vote for the private signal
with probability β∗ when the signals disagree. If χ = 1, the agents play the obedient
equilibrium since they only use their own signals under disagreement and thus from each
agent’s viewpoint the public signal is more likely to be correct.
If χ ∈ (0, 1), each agent’s equilibrium best response is derived based on the belief
that, with probability χ the other agents vote according to the (equilibrium) distribution
of votes regardless of whether their signals agree or disagree; and with probability 1− χ
votes reflect the respective agents’ signals through the equilibrium strategy. Suppose χ
is large. Then if other agents are to mix under disagreement, the posterior of an agent
with signals that disagree would still be in favour of the public signal, since the agent
underestimates the fact that, in order to be pivotal, there have to be a sufficient number
of private signals contradicting the public signal. As a result the agent votes according
to the public signal and obedience is the only symmetric χ-cursed equilibrium strategy
for large enough χ. On the other hand, there would be votes for the private signal
(under disagreement) as χ becomes smaller, while the agents still underrate their private
signal relative to the case where χ = 0. If we allow χ to vary across agents, a potential
interpretation of Table 8 would be that a significant proportion of our subjects had high
degrees of cursedness.
Although it may be possible to postulate a value of χ to fit the data, however, the
cursed equilibrium predicts that for a given χ, voters are more likely to vote for the
private signal in a fifteen-person committee than in a seven-person committee, because
conditional on the same mixing probability when the signals disagree, the weight on the
public signal in the pivotal event is larger in a larger committee and hence the agents
correct for it by voting for the private signal (more often).27 This contradicts our data
on individual voting behaviour under disagreement presented in Tables 2, 3 and 8, which
indicate that, by and large, higher proportions of the voters voted for the private signal
in the seven-person committees than in the fifteen-person committees.
8 Appendix III: Treatments without Expert Infor-
mation
We use two treatments without expert information as controls, and those are also a di-
rect test of the Condorcet jury. As we saw on Table 6 the frequency of of our subjects
26The obedient equilibrium is also a χ-cursed equilibrium for any χ ∈ [0, 1], since conditional on the
public signal, there is no further information aggregation through votes (i.e. all agents “pool” by voting
for the public signal). Therefore cursedness does not affect the agents’ posterior.
27This is also reflected in the equilibrium strategy: Proposition 3 implies β∗(p, q, n′) > β∗(p, q, n) for
any n′ > n and β∗(p, q, n′) > 0. That is, the larger the committee size is, the higher the probability of
voting for the private signal under disagreement.
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Table 9: Random effects probit: dependent variable = 1 if voted for private signal
7-person comm. (2478 obs.) 15-person comm. (2655 obs.)
Period 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Correct group decision in last period 0.1213 0.1129 0.2512** 0.0850 0.0874 0.2259
(0.0793) (0.0800) (0.1260) (0.1115) (0.1118) (0.1711)
Correct signal in last period 0.0615 0.2106 -0.0258 0.1664
(0.0783) (0.1310) (0.0910) (0.2035)
Correct signal in last period × -0.2346 -0.2400
Correct decision in last period (0.1654) (0.2276)
Constant 1.5223*** 1.4914*** 1.4235*** 2.1564*** 2.1697*** 2.0672***
(0.2273) (0.2308) (0.2368) (0.2723) (0.2764) (0.2923)
Log likelihood -800.8878 -800.5792 -799.5695 -584.6741 -584.6338 -584.0777
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level
voting according to their private signal was 84.7% in the seven-person committees and
91.4% in the fifteen-person committees. The main reason why the seven-person commit-
tees with expert information performed better than the seven-person committees without
expert information, despite the fact that the outcome of the former approximated that
of the inefficient obedient equilibrium, is that the subjects in the seven-person commit-
tees without expert information did not play according to the equilibrium and efficient
strategy often enough. The difference in the frequency between the seven-person and
fifteen-person committees without expert signal also is inconsistent with the notion of
Quantal Response Equilibrium because according to QRE, the agents’ non-equilibrium
behaviour (mistakes) should be more pronounced when the loss from a mistake is small,
which implies that subjects should vote according to the private information more often
in the seven-person committees than in the fifteen-person committees.
The exact cause of the difference in the voting behaviour is difficult to determine, but
Table 9 suggests that, at least in the seven-person committees, the subjects may have been
“experimenting” with voting against their private signal especially after the committee
decision in the previous period was incorrect. This type of (irrational) experimentation
would result in a larger proportion of votes for the private signal in larger committees.
9 Appendix IV: Experimental Instructions28
Thank you for agreeing to participate in the experiment. The purpose of this session is
to study how people make group decisions. The experiment will last approximately 55
minutes. Please switch off your mobile phones. From now until the end of the session, no
communication of any nature with any other participant is allowed. During the experi-
28The instructions here are for the treatments with fifteen-person committees and expert information.
The instructions for the other treatments are available on request.
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ment we require your complete, undistracted attention. So we ask that you follow these
instructions carefully. If you have any questions at any point, please raise your hand.
The experiment will be conducted through computer terminals. You can earn money in
this experiment. The amount of money you earn depends on your decisions, the decisions
of other participants, and luck. All earnings will be paid to you immediately after the
experiment. During the experiment, your payoff will be calculated in points. After the
experiment, your payoff will be converted into British Pounds (GBP) according to the
following exchange rate: 850 points = £1, and rounded to the nearest pound. Please
remain seated after the experiment. You will be called up one by one according to your
desk number. You will then receive your earnings and will be asked to sign a receipt.
All participants belong to a single group of fifteen until the end of this experiment.
The experiment has two parts and consists of a total of 70 rounds. The first part of
the experiment has10 rounds, and the second part has 60 rounds.
At the beginning of each round, the computer places a prize in one of two virtual boxes:
a blue box and a yellow box. [SHOW PICTURE ON FRONT SCREEN] The location of
the prize for each round is determined by the computer via the toss of a fair coin: at the
beginning of each round it is equally likely that the prize is placed in either box. That is,
the prize is placed in the blue box 50% of the time and the prize is placed in the yellow
box 50% of the time. You will not directly see in which box the prize is hidden, but as
we will describe later you will receive some information about it. [SHOW PICTURE ON
FRONT SCREEN] The box that does not contain the prize remains empty.
The group’s task is to choose a colour. In every round, each group member has two
options, either to vote for BLUE or YELLOW. [SHOW PICTURE ON FRONT SCREEN]
The colour that has received the majority of the votes becomes the group decision for the
round. In every round, each member of the group earns:
1. 100 points if the group decision matches the colour of the box that contains the
prize;
2. 5 points if the group decision does not match the colour of the box that contains
the prize.
Note that your payoff for each round is determined exclusively by the group decision. If
the group decision is correct, every group member earns 100 points. If the group decision
is incorrect, every group member earns 5 points. The payoff is independent of how a
particular group member voted.
To summarize, each round proceeds as follows: [SHOW PREVIOUS PICTURES IN
TURN]
1. the computer places a prize in one of two boxes (blue box or yellow box with equal
chance);
2. each group member receives some information about the location of the box;
3. each group member votes for BLUE or YELLOW;
4. group decision is the colour that has received most votes;
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5. each group member receives earnings according to the group decision and the actual
location of the prize.
Consider the following example. Suppose you and six other member voted for BLUE
and the eight other members voted for YELLOW. This means that the group decision is
YELLOW.
If the prize was indeed placed in the yellow box, then each group member, including
you, earns 100 points. On the other hand, if the prize was placed in the blue box, each
group member, including you, earns 5 points.
The experiment is divided into two parts. Both parts follow what we have described
so far, but they are different in terms of i) the information each group member receives
before voting, and ii) the number of rounds.
Part 1
The first part of the experiment will take place over 10 rounds. In each round, after the
prize is placed in one of the two boxes but before group members vote, each participant
receives a single piece of information about the location of the prize. We will call this type
of information Private Information. Private Information will be generated independently
and revealed to each participant separately, and it can be different for different group
members. No other participants of the experiment will see your Private Information.
[SHOW SCREEN FOR DECISION]
Private Information is not 100% reliable in predicting the box containing the prize.
Reliability refers to how often Private Information gives the correct colour of the box.
Specifically, Private Information gives each of you the colour of the box with the prize
65% of the time, and the colour of the empty box 35% of the time.
The reliability of Private Information can be described as follows:
1. In each round, after the prize is placed in one of the boxes, the computer rolls a
fair 20-sided dice for each group member. A real 20-sided dice is on your desk to help
your understanding.
2.
a. If the result of the dice roll is 1 to 13 (1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 or 13), then that
member’s Private Information is the colour of the box with the prize. Note that 13 out
of 20 times means 65%.
b. If the result of the dice roll is 14 to 20 (14,15,16,17,18,19 or 20), then that
member’s Private Information is the colour of the empty box. Note that 7 out of 20 times
means 35%.
Private Information is more likely to be correct than incorrect. Also, all group members
receive equally reliable Private Information. However, since it is generated independently
for each member, members in the same group do not necessarily get the same informa-
tion. It is possible that your Private Information is BLUE while other members’ Private
Information is YELLOW.
Finally, at the end of each round, you will see the number of votes for BLUE, the
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number of votes for YELLOW, and whether the group decision matched the colour of the
box with the prize.
Part 1 will start after a short quiz to check your understanding of the instructions.
[PART 1 COMMENCES]
Part 2
The second part of the experiment will take place over 60 rounds. In each round,
after the prize is placed in one of the two boxes but before group members vote, each
group member receives two pieces of information, namely Private Information and Public
Information, about the location of the prize. [SHOW SCREEN FOR DECISION] As
before, in each round Private Information will be generated independently and revealed
to each group member separately, and no other participants of the experiment will see
your Private Information. It gives each of you the colour of the box with the prize 65%
of the time, and the colour of the empty box 35% of the time.
The reliability of Private Information can be described as follows:
1. In each round, after the prize is placed in one of the boxes, the computer rolls a
fair 20-sided dice for each group member.
2.
a. If the result of the dice roll is 1 to 13 (1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 or 13), then that
member’s Private Information is the colour of the box with the prize. Note that 13 out
of 20 times means 65%.
b. If the result of the dice roll is 14 to 20 (14,15,16,17,18,19 or 20), then Private
Information is the colour of the empty box. Note that 7 out of 20 times means 35%.
In addition to but independently of Private Information, Public Information is revealed
to all members of your group. In each round all group members get the same Public
Information. It gives you the colour of the box with the prize 70% of the time, and the
colour of the empty box 30% of the time.
The reliability of Public Information can be described as follows:
1. In each round, after the prize is placed in one of the boxes, the computer rolls a
fair 20-sided dice (one dice roll for all members of your group), separately from the dice
rolls for Private Information.
2.
a. If the result of the dice roll is 1 to 14 (1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13 or 14), then
your group’s Public Information is the colour of the box with the prize. Note that 14 out
of 20 times means 70%.
b. If the result of the dice roll is 15 to 20 (15,16,17,18,19 or 20), then your group’s
Public Information is the colour of the empty box. Note that 6 out of 20 times means
30%.
Neither Public Information nor Private Information is 100% reliable in predicting the
box with the prize, but both pieces of information are more likely to be correct than
incorrect.
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Note that those two pieces of information may not give you the same colour (it may
be that one says BLUE and the other says YELLOW), in which case only one of them
is correct. Public Information is more likely to be correct than each member’s Private
Information. However, it could be that your Private Information is correct and the Public
Information is incorrect. Also, even if both pieces of information give you the same colour,
it may not match the colour of the box that contains the prize, since neither is 100%
reliable.
At the end of each round, you will see the number of votes for BLUE, the number of
votes for YELLOW, and whether the group decision matches the colour of the box with
the prize.
Part 2 will start after a short quiz to check your understanding of the instructions.
[PART 2 COMMENCES]
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